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Abstract 
 
Following the Germans’ first use of chlorine gas during the second battle of Ypres, the 
Entente had to develop means of protection from future poison gas attacks as well as 
systems for retaliation. This article, through the analysis of heretofore unexamined 
archival sources, considers early French attempts at engaging in chemical warfare. 
Contrary to the existing historiography, the French army aggressively adapted to, and 
engaged in, chemical warfare. Indeed, the French army would be the first to fire 
asphyxiating gas shells from field guns and, by June 1915, would pioneer the use of gas 
as a neutralization weapon to be used in counter-battery fire, as opposed to unleashing 
gas via canisters to engage enemy infantry. Such innovation invites a rethinking not only 
of French gas efforts but also of the role and evolution of the French army as a whole on 
the Western Front, a topic which the Anglophone world is in great need of examining 
further. 
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While existing historiography concerning the development of poison gases, as well as 
counter-measures to lethal gas after Second Ypres, is mostly very sound, the discussion 
of the French gas programme remains a serious weakness.  The work of William Moore 
and Ludwig F. Haber (grandson of Fritz Haber, the Nobel Prize-winning chemist 
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responsible for fixing nitrogen to make fertilizer and developing chlorine gas, among 
other things) remain the best overall sources for information about the use of gas on the 
Western Front.  Both spend significant amounts of time discussing the French 
development of lachrymatory gas (including their Bessozi gas grenades) before and 
during the First World War in their respective monographs.1  These developments, 
especially the rifle-grenade delivery system, are well known, and are also covered in Tim 
Cook’s work, among others.2  When it comes to discussing the development of deadly, 
asphyxiating gas in the French army, however, no currently published work gives a 
precise picture of what happened.  To an extent this is due to the lack of freely available 
sources in the 1970s and 1980s (Trumpener laments in his 1975 article that the 
documentary sources on French gas were yet available), although a lack of further 
scholarly research has permitted many of these gaps to persist in the historiography.3  
This situation has led to the existence of a range of assertions which are, at best, only 
partially true.  
 One of the most common misconceptions is that the French army stuck doggedly 
to the use of lachrymatory gases to the exclusion of lethal, asphyxiating variants.  Haber 
puts forward this claim succinctly: ‘In the latter part of 1915, Allied retaliation was 
entirely uncoordinated.  The British were about to launch their first gas attack [during the 
battle of Loos on 25 September 1915], the French were intending to organize themselves, 
and the Russians talked grandly of creating clouds with chlorine, phosgene, and even less 
credibly, with chloropicrin.’4  French gas efforts, according to Haber, were restricted to 
tear gas grenades and, from August 1915, the use of 75mm shells filled with the 
lachrymator perchloromethyl mercaptan, which Haber condemned as being ‘of no 
military value.’5  While the sources in question do, correctly, give the French credit for 
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being the first belligerent to use shells as a means of launching asphyxiating gas, they are 
unanimous in claiming that gas shells were not used until 1916, during the battle of 
Verdun. 
 Likewise in the realm of counter-measures to gas, the current historiography is not 
yet fully in line with the available documentation.  Haber makes the very interesting point 
that protection from noxious vapours was already quite old and relatively advanced by 
1914.6  This was owing not to fears of poison gas being used in wartime, but the practical 
response to the needs of miners and fire-fighters who needed means to protect themselves 
from the deadly conditions in which they worked.  Nevertheless, the armies that would 
clash on the Western Front marched to war without any sort of serious protective 
measures against poison gas.  Even after a pair of German soldiers deserted to the French 
and warned them of the impending gas attack at Ypres, the French are accused of having 
done nothing with the information.  According to Moore and Haber, the reports 
languished above the divisional level where they were either ignored or disbelieved.  
This, despite the fact that one of the deserters (who gave himself up to the 11e or ‘Iron’ 
division, part of the ‘Iron’ XX Corps) produced his crude gas mask to validate his story.  
Balfourier, general commanding XX Corps d’Armée (CA), is said to have brushed off the 
tale as ‘billevesée’ or ‘nonsense’.7  The chasseurs of 11e Division d’Infanterie (DI), who 
had quickly designed makeshift gas-masks in response to the story of their captive, failed 
to convince the Algerians who came to relieve them.  These same Algerians would regret 
their dismissal of the chasseurs’ warning come 22 April. 
 The only monograph to seriously address the French chemical warfare 
programme is Olivier Lepick’s La Grande Guerre Chimique, 1914–1918, published in 
1998.  This work, which covers the efforts of the French, British and German armies in 
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the realm of chemical warfare focuses evenly on all three armies, and gives the reader the 
fullest analysis of French gas efforts yet.  Lepick’s statement that, ‘in the space of a few 
months, chemical weapons would pass from being a technical curiosity to an 
indispensable component of modern warfare’ is not only precisely correct, but is a 
statement that does not seem to have been truly embraced by the wider field, which rarely 
seems to give chemical warfare the prominence it deserves in the discussion of First 
World War operations from 1915 to 1918.8   
 While Lepick does discuss the French development of asphyxiating gases in 1915 
his work misattributes the earliest uses thereof (stating that the first French use of 
asphyxiating gas was in September 1915, as opposed to June), and does not provide as 
much detail as the topic of gas warfare in the French army deserves.  Covering such a 
long period of time, and discussing developments in three major armies, the author is 
forced to focus only on that which he deems most important.  Lepick’s work is very good 
on the political and institutional issues surrounding gas warfare, but he is far less good at 
offering detailed analysis and narratives surrounding the deployment of gas on the 
battlefield.   
 The English-language literature sees the French response to the military use of 
poison gas as, on the whole, slow and ineffective.  The French are painted as unwilling to 
grasp new technology (material constraints aside) or to innovate, even in the face of 
convincing testimonials from German deserters.  They seem perpetually behind both the 
Germans and the British in developing both defensive and offensive systems for chemical 
warfare.  While the French could not claim to be world-leaders in chemistry, their 
response and preparation for chemical warfare during the Great War was much more 
robust than the current historiography implies.  Exploring data found in heretofore 
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unexamined archival sources relating to the development of asphyxiating gas in the 
French army, this article focuses on the development of both poison gas (especially gas 
shells) and protective counter-measures.  Both areas remain poorly understood and what 
follows sheds new light on the evolution of chemical warfare not only within the French 
army, but on the whole of the Western Front more generally. 
 
Protection from the Elements 
 According to existing documentation (and to be taken with a pinch of salt),  
French research on poison gas only began in January 1915 after Grand Quartier Général 
(GQG) had learned that the Germans had begun similar research the month before.9  
General Chavallier, director of engineering at the war ministry, wrote to General Bertrand 
at GQG asking if any measures were being taken to provide protection for French 
infantry against German gas attacks and to develop means of launching gas attacks 
themselves.   The answer, of course, was that there was no work being done at that time 
and thus gas first began to be seriously studied, albeit in a slow and unorganized fashion.  
Very little happened until 30 March, when GQG ordered large numbers of ‘engins 
suffocants’(tear-gas rifle-grenades) to replace the meagre stock with which the French 
had marched to war.10  To this was added an order issued by the war ministry on 17 April 
for the creation of 90,000 protective goggles to be used primarily by infantry attacking an 
enemy position that had been gassed.  These goggles would be ready by 15 May; not only 
weeks too late for the first use of gas on the western front, but also grossly insufficient for 
the needs of the vast French army.  At least partially aware of this deficiency, Joffre 
issued a note informing all of his armies and their logistical components that the delivery 
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of these goggles would soon begin, and that they should be looked after as well as 
possible by the troops to whom they were issued as they could not expect to receive a 
second pair should the first break.11 
 The Germans launched their first successful gas attack against the Ypres salient 
on 22 April.12  Both the French and the British scrambled to collect whatever information 
they could from the front and from each other while racing to develop some means of 
combating the new weapon.  On 24 April the French war minister, Alexandre Millerand, 
appointed André Kling, director of the Paris municipal laboratory, to take the lead in 
organizing research on poison gas.  Millerand encouraged Joffre to decide where Kling 
would be most useful (whether in Paris or nearer the front), and expected that Joffre 
would order that Kling be given whatever help he required.13  A monsieur Heim14 worked 
with Kling and led the research on protective counter-measures against any future gas 
attack.  Together they contacted M. Weiss, director of mining with the ministry of public 
works, who worked on the design of gas masks based on existing mining respirators.15   
 On 25 April Joffre ordered 100,000 cotton masks impregnated with sodium 
thiosulphate (Na2S2O3), to be delivered as soon as possible.
16  The very next day Foch 
was in possession of 3,200 cotton masks and 500kg of sodium thiosulphate.  2,500 masks 
and 400kg sodium thiosulphate went to the Détachement d’Armée de Belgique (the 
Belgian Army Detachment or DAB, formerly the French Eighth Army before having two 
corps taken from it to reinforce Tenth Army in Artois), which was then still engaged in 
the second battle of Ypres.  The remaining 700 and 100kg were sent to Tenth Army, 
which was preparing for what would become the second battle of Artois.  Needless to 
say, this still represented a wholly insufficient number of masks.  Foch wrote to Joffre on 
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27 April to suggest that the mass production of respirators such as were used by miners; 
at this point Tenth Army had access to only 600 such devices.17 
 Meanwhile, Kling and his associates were busy.  Three military laboratories (at 
Amiens, Châlons-sur-Marne, and Nancy) were taken over and converted, to focus on 
toxicology and medicine in relation to poison gas.18  Within days of 22 April French 
scientists had proved that the Germans had used chlorine gas.  Through autopsies and 
blood tests of gas victims they could determine the effect of chlorine gas on the body and 
began to develop basic counter-measures.  Early reports suggested two means of 
protection for the infantry as they awaited delivery of specialized gas masks.  The 
infantry might dig a large pit and fill it with water (mixed with sodium thiosulphate when 
possible).  Chlorine being water-soluble, the men could either wet cloths and cover their 
mouths and noses or hope that the pool itself neutralized some of the gas.  In addition to 
this the infantry could try to disperse the gas with petards (the hope was that the 
explosion would scatter the chlorine gas) or even flame-throwers and concentrated rifle-
fire.19  Despite high hopes it quickly became apparent that these stop-gap measures were 
ineffective and that the only real defence against gas would be the gas mask. 
 By early May the French efforts began to show some results.  The 90,000 goggles 
ordered before 22 April were ready, with another 100,000 ordered and on the way.  While 
at the time goggles were being produced at the rate of only 3,000 per diem, the war 
minister was confident that operations could easily be expanded to bring this number up 
to 10,000 a day and he suggested that Joffre outline the future goggle needs of the French 
army so that production could continue steadily without interruption.20  Meanwhile, anti-
gas balaclavas impregnated with sodium thiosulphate were being produced and 
distributed, to work in conjunction with existing gas masks.  Advances were also made in 
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the preparation of cotton masks, with more detailed and effective processes being 
designed.  Masks were to be soaked in 1kg of sodium thiosulphate, 800g of water, 150g 
of glycerine, and 100 cubic centimetres of a mixture of soda bicarbonate (25%) and water 
(75%), although this was later changed to just soda bicarbonate.21  The solution was to be 
heated and the cotton submerged repeatedly until it retained a volume of liquid roughly 
twice its original weight.  Oxygen canisters were also distributed to some frontline units 
as a means of combating asphyxiation in gas victims, when the protective measures had 
failed to prevent the gas from attacking a soldier’s mucus membranes.22 
 While these were positive developments they were not without their problems.  
Although goggle production was picking up pace, it still could not meet demand and 
individual armies began to send representatives to Paris to purchase goggles for 
themselves.  This often led to armies paying much higher prices than the war ministry 
could have negotiated and aroused the ire of GQG, which ordered that the practice be 
stopped.  Likewise reports came back that the cotton the French were using was 
inadequate and often failed to absorb the amount of liquid required to make the mask 
effective.23  On 24 May Joffre responded by asking the war ministry to provide only 
hydrophilic cotton , which would better absorb the necessary chemicals to protect the 
wearer against chlorine.  This seemed to be an acceptable solution except that the 
hydrophilic cotton shrank when it was impregnated, thus reducing the coverage offered to 
the wearer.24  When GQG first learned about the unquestionable superiority of British gas 
masks the solution became obvious: abandon all previous efforts and switch over wholly 
to the British masks, which consisted of a very large pad of cotton which could be 
impregnated with sodium thiosulphate and later urinated on to increase its ability to 
absorb and neutralize chlorine gas (any moisture greatly increased the efficacy of early 
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gas masks; the ammonia in urine further helped to neutralize chlorine which, along with 
its ubiquity, made it a good option).25 
 Franco-British liaison concerning gas during the weeks immediately following 
Second Ypres was actually quite good, despite the intense souring of their relationship as 
a result of that engagement.  Both sides were very desirous of, if nothing else, getting 
whatever information they could out of their ally concerning anti-gas measures and both 
seemed fairly open in sharing their data.  Unfortunately, their interaction does underline 
the utterly chaotic nature of the allied response to gas which had no real, clear direction 
and no over-arching institution capable of providing one.  On 28 May a report was 
produced compiling the results of both French and British research.  It confirmed that the 
Germans had used chlorine gas and that sodium thiosulphate was the best antidote: 
conclusions which were presented nearly a month after GQG had been aware of them, 
had informed all the French armies and had begun producing vast quantities of masks 
impregnated with sodium thiosulphate.26  It further confirmed the inefficacy of dry gas 
masks (a point which certain British officers had learned in action, much to their 
detriment), and went on to repeat the already-disproven claims that petard explosions 
might help to disperse gas clouds.   
 The panic and haste of the early days of gas research also led to the acceptance of 
some rather wild intelligence reports.  In mid-May the British warned the French of their 
fears that the Germans were researching a method to shower advancing allied infantry 
with sulphuric acid.27  Whether the threat was real or not is unknown, but it forced GQG 
to devote resources to its study and develop some level of defence against it.  Ultimately 
it was suggested that attacking infantry cover any exposed skin with petroleum jelly (of 
which the French army conveniently had 5 tonnes).28  Thus a fully supplied French 
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infantryman on the attack would be expected to put on an anti-gas balaclava, goggles, and 
a cotton gas mask over the balaclava, and cover himself with petroleum jelly before going 
over the top.  How a man was supposed to fight, much less lead, in this state is unclear. 
 
   *   *   * 
 
By the end of May the French had also started to see returns in their development of 
methods for using poison gas themselves.  Initially, it had been tough going.  Before the 
war there had been only one factory in France producing chlorine (Motte-Breuil).  Not 
only did it produce a very small amount of chlorine but, unsurprisingly, it was also 
funded by German capital; the French had no real chlorine production to call their own.29  
French production of chlorine had been expanded by the war ministry’s direction of 
powders and explosives as it was a key component in picric acid which itself was 
required for the manufacture of high explosives.  The fact that chlorine was needed for 
high explosives made it excessively difficult to get in quantity at the height of the shell 
scandal in spring 1915.  Nevertheless a small quantity was found for the gas programme 
and the French were able to begin testing.   
 The French first tested chlorine gas on 13 May 1915 at the military camp at 
Satory, where it was released on a 50-metre front.30  The tests were deemed successful 
and prompted further gas use and research.  They also created a basis for the French to 
develop more concrete theories for the offensive uses of gas.  It was understood that for a 
gas attack to be successful it was necessary that a sufficient density of gas be carried over 
to the enemy trenches.  If this could be achieved with sufficient speed and surprise, the 
French would be rewarded with an utterly neutralized German front line in which, under 
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the best of circumstances, the collapsed bodies of the gas victims would line the bottom 
of the trench thus keeping the gas from being absorbed into the soil; the gas would linger 
and pose a threat to any enemy reinforcements.31  Weiss, in the wake of this successful 
test, also pioneered the idea of using a smoke screen to disguise advancing infantry in 
conjunction with a gas attack to throw the enemy into confusion. 
 With the test at Satory acting as a green light for the expansion of the gas 
programme a more detailed doctrine for using gas in the field could be constructed.  
Engineers assigned to work with gas were organized into ‘Z companies’ to man ‘system 
Z apparatuses’: gas canisters.  The canisters were familiar to most engineers as they did 
not differ from normal commercial tanks used to store compressed gas.32  Special care 
was to be taken in the construction of gas canister emplacements.  As they needed to be 
in the front line to be effective, they were exposed not only to enemy shells but also to the 
eyes of the enemy, who would respond violently if he suspected a gas attack was being 
planned.33  As such, Z companies would need to balance the need to protect their gas 
canisters from enemy artillery, which posed by far the greatest risk to any gas operation, 
with the need to retain secrecy at all cost.     
 Indeed, one of the constant fears in any offensive gas operation was the possibility 
that the gas might be unleashed in friendly trenches.  It was recommended that frontline 
trenches be held as thinly as possible in the build-up to a gas attack so as to minimize the 
damage that any accidental release would cause.34  Whenever possible gas emplacements 
were to be located in forward saps somewhat away from friendly infantry, and it was 
recommended that barriers be constructed behind gas emplacements to keep gas from 
pouring down French trenches.  Extra space was to be dug behind any gas emplacement 
to ensure a continued ease of movement during the use and installation of gas canisters 
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whose size and number would necessarily take up a considerable amount of space in the 
forward trenches.35  The work in setting up a series of gas positions would be done jointly 
by gas troops and local infantry; the engineers would take on a more supervisory role, 
with the majority of the heavy lifting being done by the infantry. 
 Z companies were made up of three sections, each holding a front of roughly one 
kilometre and consisting of 1 lieutenant, 1 adjutant (second lieutenant), 4 sergeants, 10 
corporals, 100 men, 2 liaison agents, 6 kitchen staff, 1 medical orderly, 1 tailor or 
cobbler, 1 ordnance manager, and a reserve of 5 men for replacements as needed.36  
Army meteorological sections were created and attached to each Z company.  Their 
primary responsibility was to ascertain the feasibility of launching a gas attack on any 
particular day, as well as organizing the exact method of releasing gas so as to achieve 
the desired effect.  A standard gas canister took six minutes to empty and each individual 
gas emplacement was to have five canisters.  If the wind was fairly quick (10-16 
kilometres per hour, for example), the gas would have to be unleashed as quickly as 
possible to ensure that an effective concentration of gas reached the enemy.37  Likewise 
in calm conditions the gas could be released more slowly and still achieve the desired 
effect.  It would be up to the Z companies themselves to coordinate the timing of any gas 
attack as an uneven launch across a front of several kilometres might give the enemy 
sufficient warning to prepare for incoming gas, thus greatly reducing the efficacy of an 
attack.   
 While the French theory of gas warfare was reasonably advanced, it far 
outstripped French capabilities.  So long as there was a shell shortage the French could 
not devote sufficient amounts of chlorine to develop large-scale gas attacks without 
adversely affecting the production of high explosives.  Therefore, the allies would not 
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launch any large second Ypres-style gas offensives until the British attack at Loos on 25 
September 1915. 
 
Gas Shells 
 Perhaps the most interesting project the French army undertook as it sought to 
broaden its use of chemical weapons was the development of poison gas shells.  The first 
tests with fully functional gas shells occurred at Bourges in early May, with additional 
tests being run at Vincennes from 14 May 1915.38  Of the various shells tested the clear 
winner was a 75mm shell, which fired a mixture of carbon bisulphide (CS2) and 
phosphorus.  This shell not only produced asphyxiating gas but was also incendiary and 
produced large quantities of smoke.39  The day after the initial tests at Vincennes Joffre 
expressed his keen interest in these shells and wrote to the war minister asking that shells 
be produced as quickly as possible so that they could be tested at the front.  Joffre 
initially ordered 10,000 gas shells but not without taking into account the political 
implications.  He expressed concern that any French use of gas, which might be 
considered to have surpassed the Germans’ perceived barbarity in using poison gas first, 
would nullify the public-relations gold mine that the Germans had provided the allies 
during Second Ypres.40  He was especially concerned by the prospective development of 
cyanide and arsenic shells. 
 Nevertheless, within a fortnight of Joffre’s order to begin producing gas shells for 
use at the front, a store of 4,000 shells and 2,000kg of phosphorus (each shell required 
100g) had been built up at Vincennes.41  Despite Joffre’s concerns, tests were already 
underway to assess the viability of hydrocyanic acid (cyanide, HCN) shells, although the 
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results were far from perfect.  Hydrocyanic acid shells were loaded with two separate 
compartments; the outer contained 100g of potassium cyanide (KCN), while an inner 
chamber was filled with 125cc of hydrochloric acid (HCL).42  Upon detonation these two 
chemicals would mix and produce gaseous hydrocyanic acid.  Unfortunately, tests found 
that the explosion of the shell happened so quickly that the chemical reaction to create 
hydrocyanic acid did not have sufficient time to finish and thus produced an inferior 
quantity of acid compared with normal laboratory procedures.43  Far more discouraging 
were the animal test results.  In one test, a guinea pig was placed in a specially dug pit at 
Vincennes and exposed to the gas created from a single 75mm shell explosion; the 
guinea-pig did not respond to the gas.  The same guinea pig was then given a second blast 
and again failed to die.  Undoubtedly frustrated, the experimenters got two fresh guinea 
pigs and exposed them to 2kg of KCN and 2,700cc of HCL (representing the blast of 20 
75mm shells) which were detonated so as to create hydrocyanic acid.  The two guinea 
pigs, judiciously protected from the explosion, succumbed almost immediately to the 
resulting gas, thus proving that a fairly thick density would be needed if gas shells were 
to have any effect on the enemy.44 
 By the end of May tests had repeatedly shown the efficacy of gas shells and had 
won them the approval of the highest ranking French officers in GQG and the war 
ministry.  On 31 May the order of gas shells was drastically increased from 10,000 to 
50,000 and every effort was made to get gas shells into the field as soon as possible.45  By 
9 June the original 10,000 were ready for deployment, with the first shipments headed for 
Tenth Army, by then having been engaged in active fighting north of Arras for a month.  
They were ready to be dispatched at 05.00 on the 10th, just in time for the 16–18 June 
attack in Artois.  The shells were shipped with their shell casings separate, as it was 
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feared that completed shells were too volatile and might explode while in transit.  Shells 
were to be shipped lying horizontally on single-bedded carts, and absolutely no smoking 
was allowed during the shells’ transport owing to the highly flammable nature of carbon 
bisulphide.46   
 Along with the shells went detailed instructions on their properties and use for the 
artillerymen to whom they would be supplied.  The shells were described as highly 
flammable and as such were good against villages and other immobile, combustible 
defences.  Their gas-producing qualities made them suited to attacking dugouts, wooded 
areas and cantonments, where the gas would not quickly dissipate.  Above all else, the 
artillerymen were to ensure that a sufficient concentration of gas was deployed against a 
given target.47  This meant that they were best used in calm atmospheric conditions 
against carefully selected targets.  The note initially stated that between 500 and 1,000 
shells were needed to inundate sufficiently one hectare with poison gas, but this was 
crossed out by Joffre and replaced with simply 1,000.48  Since an enemy target had to be 
hit with a large volume of shells in as short a time as possible, it was strongly 
recommended that a large number of batteries be used so as to keep guns from over-
heating.  Achieving such a concentration of gas was made slightly easier by all gas shells 
having ‘instant’ as opposed to timed fuses, to ensure that they did not prematurely 
explode above the German trenches, thus making an effective use of gas all but 
impossible.49  As the French did not have a sufficient supply of gas masks the infantry 
could not advance into a gassed area, and so gas shells would be best targeted against 
areas in the enemy rear.  Gas shells could not be used in conjunction with explosive shells 
as their explosion might disperse the accumulated gas.  It was proposed however that, if 
gas shells were used against more forward positions, high explosive shells might be used 
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to disperse the gas, thus allowing the French infantry to advance.  At the end of the type-
written document Joffre signed his name and in blue ink expressed his keen desire to 
receive information on the results of the first gas shell attack as soon as possible. 
 The first launch of gas shells took place seven days later, on 16 June.  At 21.05 on 
17 June Joffre sent a telegram to Ferdinand Foch, then commanding the Groupe 
Provisoire du Nord (Provisional Northern [Army] Group, or GPN), under whose 
direction the second battle of Artois was being fought, urgently demanding information 
on the use of gas shells in order to decide whether or not the additional shells being 
produced (a second 10,000 were ready) should be sent out to Tenth Army.50  Foch 
responded two hours later, saying that he did not have enough information to provide a 
full report but that he would give Joffre his initial impressions.  Thus far, only 10% of 
shells fired were seen to produce a fireball, which meant that they were not producing the 
incendiary effect that had been desired.  Fortunately, however, the shells produced 
prodigious amounts of smoke and were responsible for completely silencing the enemy 
batteries against which they had been launched, and as such they should be judged a huge 
success; Foch urged Joffre to send him the next delivery of 10,000 gas shells.51 
 A few weeks later a full report was compiled on the use of gas shells from 16 to 
18 June 1915.  The precautions in transport had proven effective and there had been not a 
single incident of shells going off accidentally.  Gas shells had been fired at a rate of one 
round per gun per minute with five guns assigned to each hectare of enemy terrain.52  
Observation was made easy by the large plumes of smoke the shells emitted.  The main 
targets were Souchez, Angres, the Château Carleul, and various enemy battery 
emplacements (mostly in wooded areas), including La Folie, a farm near Vimy ridge.53  
According to the report the already dilapidated state of Souchez, which had been the 
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subject of intense French fire since 9 May, prohibited any incendiary effect the shells 
might have had.  The shells did seem to have better luck in Angres, however, as multiple 
fires were seen raging through the village within hours of the gas shell attack.  The 
asphyxiating nature of the shells fired on Souchez and Angres could not be easily 
verified, with the note snidely asserting that only the gas victims were in a position to 
confirm their efficacy.  Where the attack really shone was in silencing enemy batteries, a 
fact which the report highlights.  On 17 June a bombardment of gas shells fired into La 
Folie, the location of large numbers of German batteries, managed to silence the German 
artillery in front of the French XX CA for an hour and half, thus greatly facilitating a 
simultaneous infantry attack.  Based on this, the report very warmly suggested the mass 
expansion of the army’s gas shell use.  On 27 June, four days after the report was issued, 
this proposal was reinforced by the war ministry which expressed its full support for the 
increased use and production of gas shells and gas bombs, which were to be dropped 
from aeroplanes.   
 Chemical warfare had been warmly embraced by the French, who pioneered the 
use of chemical weapons for the neutralization of enemy batteries as opposed to using gas 
clouds to subdue enemy infantry.  This would go on to be an important tactical 
development as the armies on the western front eventually moved from destruction 
towards neutralization as a guiding principle in preparing trench offensives.  It is 
important to note that this advance was not the result of any particular genius on the part 
of the French.  Instead, it was an adaptation to the material constraints of a nation which 
had lost key swathes of its industrial heartland in the opening months of the war, and 
never boasted a significant chemicals industry.  The development of effective gas shells 
clearly shows that the French did add certain refinements to chemical warfare during the 
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Great War.  The acknowledgement of this fact, in conjunction with very recent 
historiography on the evolution of French tactics and operational thought during the war, 
facilitates a further reappraisal of the French efforts in 1914-1918. 
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